INTRODUCTION
In September 2012 the National Snow and Ice Data Centre in the United States reported that in the middle of that month the Arctic region recorded the lowest summer sea ice cover on record.
1 Satellite sea ice tracking started in the 1970s and at that time sea ice typically covered 50 percent of the surface of the Arctic Ocean in the summer.
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On 16 September seasonal sea ice extent covered only 24 percent of the surface of the Arctic Ocean. 3 The previous seasonal record was 29 percent cover and was registered in September 2007. 4 This trend appears to be continuing. Having completed a major research cruise, on 12 October 2012 scientists on board the German research vessel "Polarstern" reported that they discovered a large decline of thick multiyear sea ice in a 3,500 square kilometre area under study. 5 The Siberian shelves including the Laptev Sea were ice-free. In 2011 there was still multiyear ice in this region. Also, the fresh 1 "Ending Its Summer Melt, Arctic Sea Ice Sets a New Low That Leads to Warnings," New York Times, 19 September 2012, online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/science/earth/arctic-sea-ice-stops-melting-but-new-recordlow-is-set.html?_r=0. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. international maritime law conventions can be assumed to apply in their entirety and as effectively as in other regions. In addition to the powers enjoyed by coastal States and the IMO functions, the Arctic Council, the leading regional body concerned with governance in the region, is becoming increasingly active on shipping matters. A key concern of this paper is the need for greater coherency in the efforts of multiple levels of governance and to maintain a "big picture" approach in responding to the regulatory needs of increased international navigation and shipping in the region.
PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION AND SHIPPING
The significance of decreasing summer sea ice is evident from growing commercial operations. In 2009 two heavy lift vessels carrying power plant equipment from South
Korea to Rotterdam transited through the Russian Northern Sea Route without the need of assistance from icebreakers. 10 In 2010 a bulk carrier carried a cargo of iron ore from Kirkenes in Northern Norway to China, saving $180,000 in fuel on a comparable voyage via Suez. 11 That year a large tanker, in excess of 100,000 tons carried a cargo of gas condensates from Murmansk to China. 12 In 2011 there were 34 transits from Europe to Asia carrying 820,000 tons of cargo, with transit times varying between 9-11 days. 13 The sailing season was a month longer than the previous year. The 2011 transits consisted of 15 vessels carrying liquid cargoes, 10 vessels were on ballast voyages, four carried refrigerated cargo, three carried bulk cargo and two general cargo. One vessel in particular, the "Vladimir Tikhonov", a 163,000 dwt tanker, not only discovered a new high-latitude route within the Northern Sea Route, but also became the largest vessel ever to navigate in the region. 14 Unlike previous seasons, the 2012 navigation season saw vessels grouped in convoys with icebreaker support.
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Although 2012 saw a late start to the navigation season, it broke the previous year's record. Forty-six vessels transited the route, carrying a total cargo of 1,261,545 tons. 16 Twenty-five sailed eastbound while 21 sailed westbound. 17 The cargo was mostly bulk, including hydrocarbons (to China and South Korea) and iron ore (to China). 18 The navigation season lasted until November, although final transits by icebreakers were completed in December. In 2011 the last passage was just after mid-November. The transits are fast. The passage of the "SCF Amur" took seven days. 19 Inter-continental traffic aside, the Arctic region has substantial intra-regional traffic, mainly to supply northern communities and transport natural resources extracted from the region. The increased access to resources will entail further growth of intra-regional traffic. The Barents Sea promises to become a major production region with markets in Europe and Asia. In the Russian sector there are major projects for the development of hydrocarbons, including gas condensate from the Shtokman field, the Prirazlomnoye oil field, and LNG gas production from the Yamal peninusula. 32 The Yamal project needs a new fleet of polar class LNG carriers with 170,000 cubic metre capacity to carry an estimated 200 loads a year, possibly to be operated on 20-year time charters. 33 The
Norwegian offshore also holds promise. Recently it was reported that Statoil has planned a $16 billion investment that includes a 280 kilometre pipeline and production unit in the Barents Sea, to be completed by 2018 and timed with first oil produced from the Skrugard field north of the Arctic Circle. 34 Seventy-two out of 86 offshore blocks recently launched by the Norwegian Government in the 22 nd licensing round were in the Barents. 35 Oil production in the Barents could reach between 400-500,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. 36 Norway also produces iron ore in Kirkenes. In the US Arctic, there continues to be oil production in Northern Alaska near Prudhoe Bay, accounting for more than half of the oil produced in the Arctic. 37 In other areas US licensee Shell's plans for drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas is for ten wells within some delay from difficult ice conditions and delayed permits. Ironically, it has encountered ice in the two areas which is thicker than experienced in the last 20 years.
One of its drill ships dragged anchor and drifted very close to the coast. 39 Offshore exploration leases have also been granted in the Canadian sector of the Beaufort Sea.
At least one billion barrels of oil and nine trillion cubic feet of natural gas have been discovered, but the estimated potential is even higher at 5.4 million barrels for oil and 53 trillion cubic feet for gas. 40 The significance of these developments for shipping is the corollary domestic and international marine transportation of production.
Also of relevance to international navigation and shipping in the region is the growing venture tourism and cruise shipping in the region. These vessels regularly navigate the Canadian and Greenland Arctic in the summer season. 41 There is similar activity in other parts of the Arctic. In addition to cruise ships, Russia's nuclear powered icebreakers get 70-80 days of work carrying tourists and until June this year they had done so 67 times. 42 There is also a discernible increase in fishing and marine scientific and climate research vessels operating in the region. 43 Growing accessibility of the region has not been limited to large commercial vessels. navigated waters not normally ice-free, and that some 100 vessels navigated the area.
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In August this year a four-person rowing team completed a non-stop and unsupported row of over 1,000 miles from Inuvik, Canada to Point Hope, Alaska, crossing the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas over a period of 41 days.
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The increasing traffic described in this paper so far should be considered with caution.
The increase in the various types of shipping in the Arctic does not necessarily mean that navigation is comparable to other more frequently navigated routes. There is less ice, but passage is still hazardous. There can be poor weather with reduced visibility there was a late start to traffic on the Northern Sea Route and for the first two months while passage from the Kara Gate to the New Siberian Islands was in clear water, in the East Siberian Sea the ice was more difficult than the previous year. 46 The season then lasted for longer in the year. 47 In another area there was a late start to oil drilling in the Chukchi Sea by Shell because there was more ice cover than expected in the early summer. 48 Later in the summer, although passive microwave data indicated a sea that was nearly ice free, there were small ice floes that threatened the drilling platform to the point where operations were temporarily suspended. 49 The Arctic Environment Protection Strategy, which preceded the establishment of the Arctic Council, anticipated the need for protection of the fragile environment from shipping activities. 57 After its establishment, the Council tasked the PAME Working
Group to consider the impact of shipping on the Arctic marine environment. PAME eventually launched the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) study under the 53 Ottawa Declaration, ibid. In the accompanying communique, the "Ministers viewed the establishment of this new intergovernmental forum as an important milestone in their commitment to enhance cooperation in the circumpolar North. The Council will provide a mechanism for addressing the common concerns and challenges faced by their governments and the people of the Arctic. To this end, Ministers referred particularly to the protection of the Arctic environment and sustainable development as a means of improving the economic, social and cultural well-being in the North. The Arctic Council's role with regard to international shipping is likely to continue to be facilitative and to follow-up on AMSA recommendations through reporting from its member States. Even if it were to achieve a common understanding and approach to desired standards for international shipping in the region, the Arctic Council's ability to consider international shipping matters is constrained by its small membership, limitations on observers and the global nature of the shipping industry. After all, the competent international organization for the establishment of international standards and regulations for international shipping is the IMO.
Initiatives in the IMO
The north. 83 The IMO has also adopted important guidelines for vessels operating in remote Operating in Remote Areas. 85 The 2010 Manila Amendments to the Convention on Standards for Training Certification and Watchkeeping, 1978 (STCW) have paved the way for future standards and rules for polar seafaring. 86 They provide for new training guidance for personnel serving on board ships operating in polar waters including with regard to: ice characteristics and ice areas; ship performance in ice and cold climate; voyage and passage planning;
operating and handling a ship in ice; knowledge of local regulations and requirements; equipment limitations; safety precautions and emergency procedures; and environmental considerations. 87 The Manila Amendments constitute a first step in strengthening standards for polar seafaring and the STCW will need to be revisited after the expected mandatory polar code is concluded and adopted. A matter to be considered is what training standards ought to be left for the polar code rather than STCW.
Probably the most important initiative for the development of appropriate safety and environmental regulation for Arctic shipping is consideration of a mandatory polar code. are cases in point, and they are not the only relevant instruments. 93 The mandatory polar code is effectively another perspective or layer on aspects of those instruments insofar as Arctic shipping is concerned. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the question has arisen whether certain aspects of the proposed code (e.g., environmental protection) are better placed under an existing instrument rather than be re-created in a separate instrument. 94 The approach endorsed is that the polar code should be made mandatory through the adoption of amendments to particular instruments, while being aware that there could be issues of common definitions across instruments and entry into force dates under different instruments, possibly risking fragmentation. In addition to the polar code, more initiatives with regard to existing legal instruments can be expected in the future. Among these instruments MARPOL stands out with reference to an AMSA recommendation to consider special area designation for the Arctic Ocean under some of the Annexes mentioned earlier. Canada and the Russian Federation have legislated "zero" discharge rules for most ship-generated wastes (e.g., for oily waste under Annex I). 96 This national standard is higher than the MARPOL standard currently applicable in Arctic waters. 97 Another potential issue to be considered is whether "nearest land" for permitted discharge purposes, if any, needs to be re-defined to take into consideration areas where the coast is buffeted by permanent ice or where there is ice-packing. As in other marine regions, MARPOL special area designations will likely be accompanied by an expectation for the establishment of port 93 For example the ballast waters and anti-fouling conventions are also affected. See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 91. 94 102 See for instance Regulation 3, ibid., definition of a vessel restricted in its ability to manoeuvre, which could be read to include a vessel navigating through ice or ice-breaking. But this rule is premised on vessels in the area not being similarly constrained so as to take the necessary action regarding course.
thinking. 103 An understanding of what is safe speed in an ice field taking into consideration vessel and environmental factors could be useful. 104 COLREGS do not have a specific rule on convoys, now an operational practice in the provision of icebreaking services in the Northern Sea Route.
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Law of the sea framework for national regulation
A discussion on the governance challenges for international shipping in the Arctic would not be complete without some reference to jurisdictional and regulatory issues at the national level. The region is undergoing jurisdictional change as a result of regional coastal States' ability to exercise sovereign rights over extended continental shelves in most of the Arctic Ocean, as legitimated by the LOS Convention. 106 Rights over extended continental shelves, although exclusive, do not affect the legal status of superjacent waters, including international navigation. 107 The maritime zones that affect international navigation and shipping are internal waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Internal waters and territorial seas fall under coastal State sovereignty. 108 However, there remains the international right of innocent passage in the territorial sea. 109 The freedom of navigation applies to the EEZ, 110 subject to a special coastal State power to regulate international navigation for the purposes of vessel source pollution discussed below. 111 The legal concern is the extent and content of coastal State regulation of international shipping with regard to innocent passage in the territorial sea and transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Fees may only be charged for services rendered and not merely for passage. 112 The subject is complex because the legal status of large areas of waters in Canadian and Russian areas, which are prime candidates for new trade routes, is contested. Canada and the Russian Federation claim waters enclosed by straight baselines as historic internal waters and subject to national sovereignty, effectively placing those areas beyond any right of international navigation. 113 However, some States claim that those waters include straits used for international navigation and as a result they are subject to the international regime of transit passage. 114 The latter characterization potentially constrains the two coastal States in regulating international navigation. 115 It is not realistic to expect either Canada or the Russian Federation to withdraw from their positions on the legal status of those waters. The more likely scenario is for States to continue to agree to disagree and for the Arctic States in question to develop practical frameworks and arrangements to facilitate international navigation through those waters to promote development of their northern regions. This appears to be the contemporary policy and practice with regard to the Northern Sea Route.
The LOS Convention provides another dimension to coastal State power to regulate international shipping in the Arctic. In Article 234, a provision mostly negotiated between Canada, the former Soviet Union and the US, coastal States enjoy more far-reaching power to regulate international navigation within their EEZs than in any other marine region. 116 They are in a position to adopt higher standards than those generally adopted through the IMO and without the requirement to do so through the IMO. 117 They have in fact done so. The rule is accompanied by conditions and possibly uncertainties. There have to be hazards to navigation, such as severe climatic conditions and ice cover for most of the year such as to create obstructions. 118 Although the forecast is for an ice free Arctic in the summer, the winter season is longer, effectively making sure that
Article 234 powers can be exercised all year round. Another criterion is that irreversible damage could be caused to the environment, which is satisfied by the sensitive Arctic environment where the ability to combat spills is limited, either because ice is present or a spill occurs in a remote area where timely response is not possible. The rule also refers to powers to be exercised within the EEZ, and it is not clear if this is also intended to include the territorial sea. 119 The laws and regulations to be adopted must be nondiscriminatory, and have due regard to navigation. The rules must be based on the best scientific evidence, i.e., they cannot be arbitrary as otherwise they may be challenged. 
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to observe how the work on the future mandatory polar code requires cross-referencing to a range of IMO legal instruments on several issues. Although much of the edifice of international maritime law under the auspices of the IMO has been developed issue by issue, the future of Arctic shipping requires a big picture approach.
While much of the focus at this time is on the needs of the polar code, this approach will eventually require a broader view of other international rules and standards that bear on shipping activities in the Arctic than are currently being addressed. As I have had opportunity to comment elsewhere, I believe that "a comprehensive assessment of the international maritime rules, regulations and standards to determine their near-and long-term practical application in the Arctic environment" is needed. 123 For example the application of the private international maritime law conventions also needs to be examined, for example with regard to the requirements for seaworthiness in contracts of carriage. A broader legislative programme than currently under way will be necessary.
The advantage would be that the regulatory needs of Arctic shipping are approached in a systemic and coordinated manner and maritime contracting would be greatly facilitated.
The Arctic Council is playing an important role in developing a better understanding of the need for safety and environment protection in the Arctic and with due regard to the interests of indigenous peoples. It is also a forum where political consensus for future regulatory roadmaps may develop, as is the case with AMSA. However, the building of consensus and garnering support for safe and environmentally acceptable shipping in the region cannot be fully possible without a more inclusive process for participation in Arctic Council activities. The fact is the Council has limited membership and recently the rules for observers have been tightened to the point of being restrictive. 124 It is in the interest of the Arctic States to build a broader basis of support for the protection of the region by encouraging rather than discouraging other maritime States from participating 123 Chircop, "Growth of International Shipping," supra note 120, at 379. 124 Aldo Chircop, "Should Observer Participation in Arctic Ocean Governance be Enhanced?" Editorial, 7 Canadian Naval Review 2-3 (2012).
effectively in regional governance. The bulk of international shipping in the Arctic is flagged in non-Arctic States. The cooperation of all maritime States (i.e., flag States) is needed to ensure that high standards are applied to all tonnage trading in the region.
Finally, Arctic States should consider cooperation with regard to Article 234, i.e., work together to achieve the higher standards they wish to legislate and enforce for Arctic shipping, and in doing so work more closely with the IMO. At the same time, common sense ought to prevail over the need for high standards, including mandatory reporting, which serves the interests of maritime safety and effective search and rescue.
